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STUDENT COMMENTS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE
FREEZE-OUTS
One of the fundamental objectives of the federal securities laws,
as expressed in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934'
(Exchange Act), is the protection of investors and shareholders from
fraudulent and manipulative securities transactions. This section and
rule 10b-52
 promulgated under it have become one of the most con-
troversial and frequently discussed areas of securities law. Section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 have been applied by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and by the federal courts to a wide variety of unfair
practices by insiders, boards of directors, and controlling stockholders.
Originally broad in scope, these provisions have undergone such exten-
sive judicial expansion that it is now realistic to speak of a federal law
of corporations supplementing, and in some instances substituting for,
state corporation laws. Although the regulation of internal corporate
affairs has traditionally been an area within the scope of state regula-
tion,' this judicial extension was spawned by a lack of effective remedies
for unfair and deceptive practices in the purchase or sale of securities
under existing state corporation laws.'
One specific internal corporate problem to which section 10(b)
and rule 1.01)-5 have increasingly been applied is the freezing out of
minority shareholders by the controlling or majority shareholders.'
1
 15 U.S.C.	 78(j)(b) (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange.— .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
2
 17 C.F.R. 240.106-5 (1972):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange.
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
8 Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law—An Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1146, 1172
& n.109 (1965).
4 De Lancey, Rule 10b-5—A Recent Profile, 25 Bus. Lawyer 1355, 1356 (1970).
6 The terms controlling shareholders, dominant shareholders, and majority share-
holders will be used interchangeably throughout this comment to depict the dominant
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A freeze-out, also called a squeeze-out, refers to the manipulation of
corporate control to eliminate minority shareholders from a corpora-
tion, reduce their relative voting power to insignificance, or otherwise
deprive them of the rights and privileges to which they, as shareholders,
are entitled.' A variety of methods have been used to accomplish
freeze-outs.' Some of the most common methods include merging the
corporation into another corporation wholly-owned by the majority
shareholders of the original company; selling the corporate assets to
a company newly formed by the majority shareholders; issuing addi-
tional common stock, thereby diluting the voting strength of the
minority shareholders; dissolving the corporation; and refusing to de-
clare dividends.' While most states provide an appraisal remedy for
some of these corporate manipulations,' rule 10b-5 has provided the
possibility of a more effective remedy for the minority shareholder
when the conditions for a cause of action under the rule have been met.
Two recent federal cases, Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co." and
Krafcisin v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co.," are representative of the
continuing conflict in the freeze-out area and bring into focus the most
recent phase of the expansion of 10b-5 into internal corporate affairs----
an area traditionally governed by state law. In each case a minority
shareholder brought suit in federal district court, alleging violation of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and seeking to enjoin structural corporate
changes, which the majority shareholders were using to freeze him out.
Despite the factual similarities, the courts used different reasoning to
arrive at different conclusions as to the applicability of rule 10b-5 to
the freeze-outs. The conflicting decisions in these cases are charac-
teristic of a more general conflict over a long period of time with
regard to how far rule 10b-5 should be judicially extended.
This comment will review the development of state laws dealing
with unfair and deceptive conduct by majority shareholders aimed at
minority interests. It will examine the development of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 as they relate to such conduct, and the conflict between
traditional federal and state law concepts. Finally, it will attempt to
define the future scope of the interrelationship between federal and
state corporation law in the area of freeze-outs based upon the Bryan
decision.
group within the corporation, since freeze-outs are frequently accomplished by groups
holding less than a majority of the voting shares by means of proxy statements or tender
offers.
6 2 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 8.07, at 43 (2d ed. 1971).
7 For an extensive discussion of the various freeze-out techniques and possible reme-
dies, see F. O'Neal & J. Derwin, Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates §§ 3.01-
5.15 (1961); O'Neal, Oppugnancy and Oppression in Close Corporations: Remedies in
America and in Britain, 1 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
8 These methods are discussed in F. O'Neal & J. Derwin, supra note 7, at 3.01-5.15.
" See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
10 343 F. Supp. 1062 (ND. Ga. 1972).
11 [1972-1973] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Q 93,586 (ND. 111. 1972).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE CORPORATION LAW
There has never been any agreement among state courts as to the
duty, if any, owed by the majority or controlling shareholders of a
corporation to the minority shareholders with respect to private trans-
actions between them involving the . corporation's shares. Two divergent
schools of thought have developed. Most states, including all but a
few of the less industrialized ones," traditionally imposed upon con-
trolling shareholders a fiduciary obligation, but only toward the cor-
poration itself or toward those acting on behalf of the corporation."
Under this view the corporation was conceptualized as a separate legal
entity, distinct from its shareholders. Thus, in the majority of juris-
dictions, controlling shareholders were free to act in their own un-
trammeled self-interest when engaged in a private transaction with
minority shareholders. A minority of jurisdictions took a contrary
view, impressing upon majority shareholders a fiduciary duty to dis-
close to minority shareholders all material information relevant to
any private transaction between them involving the corporation's
stock."
Even under the minority rule, however, courts had difficulty find-
ing that a controlling shareholder had violated a fiduciary duty to the
minority when the transaction was between the minority shareholder
and the corporation itself." Consequently, where controlling share-
holders were unable to persuade the unwanted minority shareholder
to sell his shares in a private transaction, they frequently caused the
corporation to undergo a structural change which resulted in the elimi-
nation of the minority interest. For example, the entire assets of the
corporation would be sold to a newly formed corporation wholly-owned
by the majority, and the consideration received would be distributed
12 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1446 n.4 (1961).
12 Id. at 1446.
14 See, e.-.,g Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Stewart v. Harris,
69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904); 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1447. In Kavanaugh v.
Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919), the New York Court of
Appeals reversed the dismissal of a complaint which alleged that a dissolution was
being used to freeze out the plaintiff (there being no appraisal right), holding that
majority shareholders as well as directors were "burdened and restricted by fiduciary
obligations" to minority shareholders. Id. at 195, 123 N.E. at 151. The Supreme Court
of Washington, in Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904),
also enjoined a freeze-out by means of dissolution, stating that the state dissolution
statute did not give the majority shareholder an absolute right to dissolve the corpora-
tion without a legitimate business reason, and that the minority shareholder had a right
to retain his interest in the business. Id. at 30, 74 P. at 1006.
12 In Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952), the court
found a fiduciary duty, but held that the majority shareholder had not breached his
fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder since there had been a complete disclosure
of the facts involved in the merger and the merger was supported by a valid business
purpose. The business purpose test as a standard of fiduciary duty, however, is a less
stringent one than that applied in Kavanaugh. This distinction raises the issue of under
what circumstances a majority shareholder is justified in forcing a minority shareholder
out of the corporation against his will; see discussion in text at notes 83-84 infra.
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in liquidation." Although substantially all the states require share-
holder consent for such a change, the statutes typically provide for
approval by two-thirds of the voting shares.n Thus the minority share-
holder was often helpless to prevent such a freeze-out.
In an attempt to mitigate any unfairness produced by such statu-
tory provisions and to avoid the harsh effects of the majority rule
respecting the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders, most jurisdic-
tions now afford a minority shareholder the opportunity to dissent from
a proposed corporate change and receive an agreed upon sum or the
appraised value of his shares in cash from the corporation." The
theory upon which the right of appraisal is based is that no investor
should be forced to remain as a shareholder in a corporation or busi-
ness which is substantially different. from that in which he originally
invested." Although it has been argued that appraisal rights are un-
necessary when a corporation's shares are publicly traded since one
who no longer wishes to remain a shareholder can dispose of his shares
through a broker at market value without the expenses or delays of
litigation,2° such rights may indeed be important to the minority share-
holder in a closely held corporation.
Appraisal, however, has proved for a number of reasons to be a
rather unsatisfactory remedy for the minority shareholder being frozen
out of his corporation.2' First, most states do not grant an appraisal
right for every fundamental corporate structural change, especially for
those changes which may be effected by the board of directors without
shareholder approval." Second, the statutes of some states provide that
12
 See, e.g., Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970).
17 With regard to mergers, see Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.64 (Smith-Hurd 1954);
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 903(a)(2) (Supp. 1972). Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp.
1970) requires only a majority 'vote. With regard to sales of substantially all of the
corporation's assets, see Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.72 (Smith-Hurd 1954) ; Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 271 (Supp. 1970) (majority vote).
is See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1970) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
156, §§ 46, 46E (1970) ; N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623 (1963). A shareholder may forfeit
his right of appraisal by ,voting in favor of the structural change. See, e.g., Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. Bus.' Corp. Law § 623(b) (1963) ; Ind. Code
§ 23-1-5-7 (Burns 1972); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.85 (Baldwin 1970), In addition,
some states require that the dissenter vote against the change in order to preserve his
appraisal right. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 612-40 (1956); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 294:76
(1966). Also, a dissenting shareholder must in some states give notice of his demand
for appraisal within a specified period of time. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(b)
(Supp. 1970); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623 (1963); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.200(763)
(Spec. Pamphlet 1973). For a discussion of how some corporate majorities have evaded
the appraisal rights of minority shareholders in mergers, see F. O'Neal and J. Derwin,
supra note 7, at § 4.06.
10 See H. 13allantine, Corporations § 298 (rev. ed. 1946).
20 Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
Yale L.J. 223, 233 (1962).
21 See generally Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal
Right, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1964).
22 See Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1630, 1635
(1961), Most states provide appraisal upon consolidation or merger, while some states
1255
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
where a right of appraisal exists, it shall be the dissenter's exclusive
remedy," and courts in' a few of these states have concluded that
equitable relief is barred by implication." Third, the minority share-
holder in a freeze-out situation is frequently not interested in getting
the fair market value for his shares, but in remaining as a shareholder
in the corporation with full rights of participation in its future earnings
and appreciation in value." Fourth, in a close corporation situation,
appraisal will often leave the minority shareholder with something less
than the true value of his shares, force undesirable tax consequences
upon him, or otherwise affect him adversely."
A compelling argument may be made that while the freedom of
the controlling shareholders to manage the corporation ought not to be
impinged, neither should a minority shareholder be forced to relinquish
his interest in the corporation unless the proposed structural change
has a genuine business purpose beyond a desire on the part of the
majority to freeze him out.'T This reasoning has gained increasing
approval, and many states—including some which previously held ap-
praisal to be an exclusive remedy"—now permit shareholders to sue
in equity to enjoin a corporate action where bad faith or fraud can be
shown." Such suits have been won- by minority shareholders on an
expanded fiduciary duty theory—i.e., a controlling shareholder, like a
director, is, vis-à-vis the minority, in a position of trust with respect
make it available for a sale of all or most of the assets of the corporation. See text at
note 18 supra. Yet very few states provide appraisal for dissolution. The lack of con-
sistency within the individual state statutes has been criticized, but it seems to be logical
to distinguish between situations in which the minority shareholder receives a propor-
tionate share of the proceeds from a sale of assets or a dissolution and liquidation on
the one hand, and those structural changes in which he receives only an interest in a
totally different organization than that he invested in on the other.
26 See Cal. Corp. Code § 4123 (West Supp. 1955) (for mergers); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, § 1515(K) (1967).
24
 Blumner v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 99 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1 950);
Geiger v. American Seeding Mach. Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N.E. 594 (1931). In
Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1952),
the court in effect said that where the appraisal remedy will provide the minority share-
holder with the full value of his holdings in the company, a court would not enjoin
the transaction even if the avowed purpose of the majority were to squeeze out the
minority shareholder.
28
 The right not to be locked into a corporation when it has undergone a funda-
mental change may arguably have an analog in a corresponding right to remain as a
shareholder in a corporation which has undergone no such change or where a change
takes place in form only.
26 See Vorenberg, supra note 21, at 1201-04.
27 Id. at 1204.
28 E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.54 (1963), providing that appraisal was the exclusive
remedy of a shareholder dissenting to a merger, was repealed by the 1973 Business
Corporation Act § 771, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.200(771) (Spec. Pamphlet 1973), pro-
viding for non-exclusivity of the appraisal remedy.
29 see , e.g., Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill. App, 261, 106 N.E.2d 848 (1952);
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); cf. Opelka
v. Memorial Bridge Co., 335 Ill. App. 402, 410-11, 82 N.E.2d 184, 188 (1948).
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to all his dealings involving the corporation." The validity of this
theory was asserted by the United States Supreme Court in the 193 9
bankruptcy case of Pepper v. Litton:"
[A controlling shareholder] cannot use his power for his per-
sonal advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders . .
no matter bow absolute in terms that power may be and no
matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical require-
ments."
In characterizing the obligation of the majority as a position of trust,
the Court imposed upon controlling shareholders the burden of proving
that a given transaction was not only executed in good faith but was
inherently fair."
A recently decided California case, Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson &
Co.," adopted the reasoning of Pepper and is indicative of an accelerat-
ing trend toward state court recognition of a fiduciary duty owed by
the majority to minority shareholders." In Jones, the majority share-
holders exchanged their shares in a savings and loan association for a
larger interest in a newly formed holding company. The assets of the
savings and loan were then pledged to secure holding company debts.
The scheme was to destroy the market value of plaintiff's shares and
effectively disenfranchise her. The court, in a well-reasoned opinion,
found this to be a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty to exercise
control in an equitable manner," stating that:
The increasingly complex transactions of the business
and financial communities demonstrate the inadequacy of
the traditional theories of fiduciary obligation as tests of
majority shareholder responsibility to the minority. These
theories have failed to afford adequate protection to minority
shareholders and particularly to those in closely held cor-
porations whose disadvantageous and often precarious posi-
tion renders them particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of
the majority."
20 At first, such suits were only allowed where "special facts" existed which could
be held to give rise to a fiduciary duty, such as the controlling shareholder's inside
position or his intimate knowledge of corporate affairs. 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, at
1447. More recently, the range of facts sufficient to constitute such special circumstances
has been gradually expanded by the courts to the extent that a fiduciary duty on the
part of the majority may be said to exist in virtually all situations involving transac-
tions in the corporation's stock, whether they act in their capacity as shareholders or
through directors or officers whom they control. Id. at 1447-48.
81 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
52 Id. at 311.
38 Id. at 306.
34 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969), noted in 70 Colum. L.
Rev. 1079 (1970) and 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1904 (1970).
35 Cf. F. O'Neal, supra note 6, at 45.
36 1 Cal. 3d at 108, 460 P.2d at 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
37 Id. at 111, 460 P.2d at 473, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
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Widespread adoption by states of a fiduciary duty rule for majority
shareholders gives rise to a potential conflict between state corpora-
tion law and federal securities law relating to unfair and deceptive
practice in stock transactions. The federal law, particularly section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, was enacted for the purpose of protecting
investors from fraudulent securities transactions—an area in which
state laws were considered to be inadequate at the time. The federal
statute was not, however, intended to preempt complementary state
corporation law, but merely to establish concurrent jurisdiction."
At a time when most state courts would grant injunctive relief from a
corporate freeze-out only if common law fraud was involved, section
10(b) offered an attractive alternative to minority shareholders experi-
encing a freeze-out." Originally broad in scope, section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 have undergone a most extensive judicial expansion." Per-
haps it is partly in response 'to this expansion and a corresponding
fear that federal law would supplant state jurisdiction over an impor-
tant aspect of corporate affairs". that state courts have become in-
creasingly protective of the rights of investors, especially minority
shareholders, in stock transactions." Nevertheless, the continued ex-
pansion of the federal remedy and its availability to freeze-out victims
has prevented the resurgence of state court suits to enjoin freeze-outs,
and assured federal pre-eminence as the protector of the minority
shareholder." Whether the federal courts will retain this position is
open to question. The Krafci,sin and Bryan cases represent contradic-
tory views in the latest attempt of the federal courts to answer this
question.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW IN
RELATION TO FREEZE-OUTS
A. Early Development of 10b-S
The antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act were intended by
Congress to be a major weapon in the drive to eliminate the widespread
33 Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 Fad 51, .54 (3d Cir. 1939): "Congress
by the language employed sought only to make it abundantly clear that it was not
pre-empting this field to the federal jurisdiction, thereby prohibiting recovery to de-
frauded individuals under the law of the states as that existed prior to the passage
of the Securities Act." But see McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961) (referring to a procedural state security-for-expenses
rule): "[S]tate law will only control where that law will not cut across the federal
interests receiving expression in the federal right sought to be enforced."
89 See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947), in which
the district court on a motion for summary judgment dismissed the count based on
common law fraud, but found sufficient facts to support a cause of action under rule
10b-5. On appeal, the dismissal of the common Iaw count was reversed. 162 F.2d 36
(3d Cir. 1947).
40 See Note, Recent Judicial Extensions of SEC Rule 10b-5, 63 Colum. L. Rev.
934 (1963).
41 Fleischer, supra note 3, at 1148, 1151.
42 See text at notes 27-30 supra.
48 See text at notes 128-30 infra.
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abuses in the securities markets that existed in the early 1930's.44
Prior to its passage, the only remedy a defrauded shareholder had was
an action at common law for deceit. To support such a cause of action,
it was necessary for a plaintiff to prove that (1) a false representation
of fact had been made by the defendant," (2) the defendant knew that
the representation was false and intended to deceive the plaintiff
(scienter), and (3) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation
to his injury." It was intended that section 10(b) be liberally con-
strued47
 and "free of the ancient and illogical distinctions that . .
haunted state fraud law."" Nevertheless, even after the implementation
of section 10(b) through promulgation of rule 10b-5, there was sub-
stantial uncertainty as to whether the standard of fraud under the rule
was any different from the standard of common law fraud." The courts,
however, in interpreting 10(b) broadly so as to prevent the frustration
of its purpose, have developed standards of fraud and deceit less
restrictive than those of the common law."
In adjudicating disputes under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the
threshold question faced by the courts was whether private rights of
action were to be permitted. In spite of the absence of a specific pro-
vision in section 10(b) for a civil action by a private individual, and
the fact that other sections of the securities laws do provide for private
remedies," the federal courts have consistently held that a private
right of action is implied by section 10(b)." To establish a cause of
44 Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 8-30 (1942). See also H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-4 (1933); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934).
45 Some cases have held that a concealment amounting to a false or misleading
representation is sufficient to satisfy the first element. See, e.g., Brainerd Dispatch News-
paper Co. v. County of Crow Wing, 196 Minn. 194, 196, 264 N.W. 779, 780 (1936).
Other cases suggest that the false representation must involve a breach of equitable or
legal duty. See Coppo v. Coppo, 163 Misc. 249, 252, 297 N.Y.S. 744, 750 (Sup. Ct.
1937); Howard v. West Jersey & S.S.R. Co., 141 A. 755, 757 (N.J. Eq. 1928).
4° Restatement of Torts 537 (1938); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 686 (4th ed. 1971).
47 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1435.
48 Fleischer, supra note 3, at 1175.
40 See Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 1016 n.101
(1957).
Go See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 831 (D. Del. 1951)
(citing cases); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc,, 375 U.S. 180, 185-86, 195
(1963). In applying these standards, the courts have generally taken into account the
relative sophistication of the parties involved in the transaction. Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F.2d 634, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1963). For a detailed discussion of the relationship
between common law deceit and 10b-5 fraud, see 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1430-44.
01 E.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11-13, 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)-(m),.(o) (1970);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9, 16, 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78(i), (p), (r) (1970).
52 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Kardon , v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(ED. Pa. 1946). For a criticism of this judicial creation of a private right of action,
see Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implica-
tion Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 185 (1964). The Supreme Court, however,
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action under rule 10b-5, the courts initially required plaintiffs to prove
that (1) the defendant made use of the mails or other instrumentality
of interstate commerce, (2) the defendant made a false or misleading
representation or omission of a material fact, (3) such statement or
omission was in connection with a transaction in which the plaintiff
was a purchaser or seller of stock," (4) the defendent was in a rela-
tionship of privity with the plaintiff," (5) plaintiff relied on the
misrepresentation," and (6) the misrepresentation caused the plaintiff's
injury.5 °
Gradually each of these elements has undergone expansion or
erosion at the hands of the federal courts. Plaintiffs bringing an action
under section 10(b) have had little trouble satisfying the first of these
requirements, relating to the use of an instrumentality of interstate
commerce, since use of the mails or telephone in some aspect of the
transaction occurs in almost every instance." The second requirement,
that the defendant have made an untrue statement of a material fact
or have omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made not misleading, would seem to suggest that some state-
ment on the part of the defendant is required. However, the courts
have found that a complete nondisclosure can also constitute a pro-
hibited misrepresentation" if it relates to a material fact which would
affect the value of the stock or the judgment of the plaintiff as to
whether or not to purchase or sell his stock." The third requirement—
that the misrepresentation be in connection with the purchase or sale of
stock—has been interpreted very liberally by the courts. In the context
of a freeze-out, the concept of a sale has been extended to include any
recently eliminated any doubt as to the existence of an implied right of action under
10b-5 in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
53 Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999
(1971); Jensen v. Voiles, 393 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1968); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Co., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Greenstein v. Paul, 275 F. Supp. 604, 605-06
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968).
54 Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
55 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 226 F.2d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 1959); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1963).
66 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
57 The easy satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements stems from the fact that
the misrepresentation does not have to be transmitted through the mail or interstate
commerce. Any connection ,between the jurisdictional means and the misrepresentation
is sufficient for 10b-5 purposes. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967);
Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1953).
58 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
50 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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fundamental corporate structural change such as a merger or dissolu-
tion, in which a shareholder is forced, by a state appraisal statute or
otherwise, to relinquish his stock for a sum of money, 6° Closely related
to the purchase or sale of stock requirement is the requirement that
there must be privity between the plaintiff and defendant. While it
was clear that such a relationship existed where one was buying shares
sold by the other in a direct transaction between the two, this relation-
ship has since been found to be unnecessary where shares are simply
traded by plaintiff on a securities exchange." The fifth element origi-
nally required that the plaintiff have reasonably relied on the mis-
representations made by the defendant. However, the acceptance by
the courts of nondisclosure as violative of 10b-5 necessitated a more
flexible treatment, since a plaintiff could not logically rely upon a mis-
representation where none was made.' As a result, the reliance require-
ment was gradually merged into the final requirement—causation."
The result of this merger is that a plaintiff need no longer prove that
he relied on a false representation, but simply that the deception in
some way caused his injury. The requirement that a causal connection
be shown between the misrepresentation and the plaintiff's injury, how-
ever, has remained as the major obstacle to plaintiffs seeking relief from
a corporate freeze-out.
In Krafcisin and Bryan, the question was raised by each plaintiff
whether, at least in some situations, a minority shareholder may in-
voke section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 even though there is no causal
relationship between the manipulation connected with a corporate
merger or dissolution and his injury by reason of the loss of his share
of ownership in the company by the forced sale of his stock. The
plaintiffs argued that a duty is owed by the majority to the minority
shareholders not to freeze them out of the corporation, violation of
which is, even absent causation," sufficient to create a cause of action
CO Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) (liquidation); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383
(5th Cir. 1970) (liquidation) ; Mader v. Armel, 384 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1968) (full
merger); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967) (full merger); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967)
(short form merger). The principle emerging from these cases has become known as
the "forced seller" rule. The buyer-seller requirement has also been extended to include
"aborted sellers" (see A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967));
"frustrated sellers" (see Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1965)); and "would-be sellers" (see Shulof v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Former & Smith,
Inc., [1470-1971] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 93,147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)). See also Voeghe
v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); Gann v. Bernzomatic Corp., 262
F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co.,
307 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1962). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968).
62 De Lancey, Rule 10b-S—A Recent Profile, 25 Bus. Lawyer 1355, 1371 & n,67
(1970).
68 Id. at 1373.
04 The causation referred to here, and throughout this comment, is the proximate
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under 10b-5. The positions taken by the Krafcisin and Bryan courts
are indicative of the significant degree of conflict on this question."
Considered together, they represent one of the frontiers of the extension
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 toward the establishment of a federal
fiduciary duty."
B. Krafcisin and Bryan: Causation and the Federal Fiduciary Duty
Under Rule 10b-5
Krafcisin v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co. and Bryan v. Brock &
Blevins Co. presented similar facts. In each case a minority shareholder
brought suit in federal district court under section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act and rule 10b-5 to enjoin corporate structural changes
allegedly designed by the majority shareholders to eliminate the minor-
ity's interest in the corporation. Despite the factual similarities, the
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois followed different lines of
reasoning and arrived at different conclusions.
In Krafcisin, the defendant majority shareholders gave the plain-
tiff notice of a special shareholders' meeting to be held for the purpose
of considering voluntary dissolution of the company. The plan of
liquidation adopted by the majority provided for a distribution of the
corporate assets in which Krafcisin was to receive a cash payment and
the defendants were to receive property." The plaintiff alleged that
the underlying motive for the proposed dissolution was to freeze him
causation which is an element of a 10b-5 action. This is to be distinguished from the
causal relationship between the breach of the duty claimed to exist by the plaintiffs in
Krafcisin and Bryan and the injury to them.
65 Compare Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), with
Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969), and Weber
v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201. (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
06 In Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947), the court reversed
the dismissal of an action for damages brought by minority shareholders who were
deceived into redeeming their shares for a price below what they would have received
in the forthcoming but undisclosed liquidation planned by the majority. The court found
that under federal law, a majority stockholder
occupies a fiduciary relation towards the minority stockholders, and is charged
with the duty of exercising a high degree of good faith, care, and diligence for
the protection of such minority interests. Every act in [the majority's] own
interest to the detriment of the holders of minority stock becomes a breach of
duty and of trust, and entitles to [sic] plenary relief from a court of equity.
The court based this holding on several early federal cases which had imposed such a
duty on the majority; e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919);
Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 F. 529, 537 (6th Cir. 1915). Since the
complaint in Zahn did not allege violations of the federal securities laws, and since the
eases cited by the court were decided prior to Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
the holding was apparently grounded in the old federal common law which should no
longer have been applicable in view of Erie and the passage of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Exchange Act. Thus, it is apparent that there is no federal common law
fiduciary duty.
67 [1972-1973] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,586, at 92,728.
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out of the corporation, that the defendants did not reveal this purpose
in the notice to shareholders, and that the defendants attempted to
deter him from opposing the plan of liquidation by falsely representing
that the amount of cash to be paid for each of his shares exceeded the
per share value of the property to be distributed to the majority for
their shares."
The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. It reasoned that it was not necessary
for the defendants to have informed Krafcisin of their intention to
freeze him out since the proposed dissolution should have put him on
notice that he might have to relinquish his shares." In addition the
court found that Krafcisin's receipt of a lower price for his shares was
not in itself sufficient to show that the plan of liquidation was inequi-
table.. With regard to the alleged misrepresentation, the court concluded
that even if this had been a violation of 10b-5, Krafcisin lacked stand-
ing to raise that issue since there was no causal relationship between the
misrepresentation and the injury claimed." The court reasoned that
since the defendants owned ninety-six percent of the stock of the
corporation, they could have effected a voluntary dissolution under the
Illinois Business Corporation Statute" regardless of the opposition of
Krafcisin or the state of his knowledge." Thus, the court held that
Krafcisin had suffered no injury cognizable under section 10(b) or
rule 10b-5. Implied in the decision was a holding that rule 10b-5 will
not protect a minority shareholder from a corporate freeze-out where
the freeze-out is accomplished by a corporate action authorized by
state law.
In Bryan, the plaintiff owned fifteen percent of the stock of Brock
& Blevins and had, until his resignation, been an employee and director
of the company. Shortly after his resignation, the majority shareholders
attempted to buy Bryan out, threatening to acquire his shares forcibly
by effecting a fundamental corporate change if he refused to sell."
Bryan declined to relinquish his stock because he considered the price
offered for his shares to be less than their actual value." Subsequently,
the other shareholders of Brock & Blevins formed a new corporation,
Power Erectors, Inc., and excluded Bryan from participation in the
new company." These shareholders, constituting all of the directors
and shareholders of the new corporation, next exchanged their Brock
& Blevins stock for Power Erectors stock, making Power Erectors the
08 Id. at 92,729.
00 Id. at 92,728-29.
70 Id, at 92,729.
71 Ill. Ann, Stat. ch. 32, § 157.76(c) (Smith-Hurd 1954) requires the approval of
two-thirds of the outstanding voting shares to effect a voluntary dissolution.
72 [1972-1973] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 	 93,586, at 92,728.
78 343 F. Supp. at 1065.
m Id.
75 Id.
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owner of eighty-five percent of Brock & Blevins. They then began pro-
ceedings to merge Brock & Blevins into Power Erectors. Under the
plan of merger, the eighty-five percent of the Brock & Blevins stock
owned by Power Erectors was to be cancelled, and Bryan was to receive
a cash amount for his stock, thus eliminating Bryan from all ownership
rights . 76
The court permanently enjoined the merger of the two companies,
holding that the actions of the majority shareholders were fraudulent
and deceptive acts violative of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 77 The
injunction issued in spite of the fact that, as in Krafcisin, the minority
' shareholder was powerless under state law to prevent the merger. The
applicable Georgia statute78 provided for a merger upon approval of
a majority of the voting shares, and the majority owned eighty-five
percent of the Brock & Blevins stock. The decision was based on the
failure of the majority to disclose to Bryan the probability of a public
offering of securities by the company in the near future," an error in
the income statement used in the valuation of his stock," and the
existence of an intention and a plan to freeze Bryan out of the com-
pany. 81
 But the court makes it reasonably clear that the last ground
alone would have provided a sufficient basis to enjoin the merger."
The implication here, contrary to that in Krafcisin, was that rule 10b-5
may be applied to enjoin the freeze-out of a minority shareholder
regardless of whether the method employed is a structural change
permitted by state law.
Thus, the narrow but important point on which the two district
courts disagreed is whether and to what extent rule 10b-5 may be
invoked by minority shareholders to prevent a freeze-out by the major-
ity where the mechanics of the corporate device used are sanctioned
under state law. The approaches of these two courts to this question,
the decisions rendered and the rationale therefor may be a key to
gauging the propensity of some federal courts to further extend section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 into the area of internal corporate affairs—an
area traditionally governed by state law.
At the outset, the two courts have an apparently irreconcilable
conceptual disagreement. The Krafcisin court believes that a minority
shareholder has no absolute right to retain ownership in a corporation
when the majority shareholders wish to eliminate him." The Bryan
court believes that a corporate majority has no right to exclude a
76 Id. at 1066.
77 Id. at 1070.
78 Ga. Code Ann. § 22-1003 (1970).
79 343 F. Supp. at 1069.
8° Id. at 1066. '
at Id. at 1070.
8 2 Id.: "The proposed merger itself was a course of business which would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon Bryan, in connection with the sale of his stock." (Emphasis
added.)
88 [1972-19731 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 4 93,586, at 92,730.
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minority shareholder from continued ownership against his will unless
there is a "plausible business purpose" for such action." This theoreti-
cal difference is reflected most directly in the courts' legal analyses of
the causation requirement in a 10b-5 action. To fully appreciate the
complexities and ramifications of these analyses, some historical back-
ground is necessary.
In all of the early 10b-5 cases, before a plaintiff could recover,
he was required to show that a causal connection existed between some
misrepresentation, omission or other deceptive device alleged and the
injury complained of. 85 This requirement was closely related to the
buyer-seller and reliance requirements; i.e., if the plaintiff could not
show that he had purchased or sold securities in reliance on the mis-
representation, such misrepresentation could not have caused his in-
jury." These requirements made it especially difficult for a minority
shareholder victimized by a freeze-out in the form of a merger or
liquidation to remain in federal court beyond the preliminary stages of
his case."
Seven years before Krafcisin and Bryan, a case arose in the
Southern District of New York involving the freeze-out of a minority
shareholder. In Barnett v. Anaconda Co.," the minority shareholder
sued to enjoin a sale of assets and corporate dissolution on the ground
that deceptions and misrepresentations contained in the proxy state-
ment violated sections 10(b) and 14(a)" of the Exchange Act. The
court dismissed the claim, finding the element of causation, necessary
to sustain the action under either section, to be lacking. The court noted
that since the controlling shareholder owned seventy-three percent of
the stock of the corporation, he had the power to effect a merger under
state law. Any misrepresentations could not, therefore, have caused the
plaintiff's injury, the court reasoned, since the minority shareholder
could not have prevented the dissolution by any "internal corporate
procedures."°° Under this rationale, a minority shareholder who ac-
ceded to a dissolution because he was misled by misrepresentations
made by the majority could not recover where the only alternative
available to him, had he known the true facts, would have been such
external actions as a state court injunctive suit or public exposure of
84 343 F. Supp. at 1068, citing with approval Vorenburg, Exclusiveness of the
Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1964).
85 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969); De Lancey,
supra note 62, at 1372.
8° List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
87 One difficulty with these early 10b-5 cases is the failure of the courts to indicate
the specific factors on which their decisions turned, i.e., the existence or non-existence
of appraisal rights; a misrepresentation or nondisclosure by the defendant; the absence
of causation; the absence of reliance; etc.
88 238 F. Supp. 766 (SD.N.Y. 1965).
89 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (a) (1970).
99 238 F. Supp. at 776 (emphasis added).
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the scheme in order to shame the majority into abandoning it." In
effect, the court established the availability of such internal corporate
procedures to combat a corporate structural change taking place under
state corporation law as a standard or test to determine whether the
element of causation was present. The internal-corporate-procedures
test achieved only a very limited acceptance,° 2 however, and was seldom
followed until the Krafcisin court, without citing Barnett, adopted that
case's rationale.
In 1966, only one year after Barnett, a case in the Eastern District
of New York, Laurenzano v. Einbender," presented similar facts. The
plaintiff minority shareholder sued on behalf of himself and the cor-
poration to enjoin a corporate structural change on the ground that
the proxy solicitation made in connection with the transaction was
false and misleading. The defendant majority shareholders responded
with the Barnett argument that since they owned a controlling interest
sufficient to ensure approval of the proposed transaction without the
votes of any potential dissenter who might have been deceived by
the proxy statement, a defective proxy could not be the legal cause of
the plaintiff's injury. The court, however, found that a shareholders'
meeting and vote required by law does not become "nugatory and
dispensable because one stockholder owns enough shares to carry any
resolution and can be expected to vote in favor of his own resolutions.s 9"
The result of the meeting was not a legal conclusion, stated the court,
nor was it impossible that an unfavorable vote by the minority might
bring about a modification or reconsideration of the transaction—"in
corporate circles, consensus can be a desideratum.' Based on this
reasoning, the court denied the defendants' motion for dismissal, hold-
ing that if the plaintiff could prove the proxy statement misleading,
the validity of the meeting would be destroyed and a causal relation-
ship between the misrepresentations and plaintiff's injury would be
clearly established." Thus, while it did not reject the internal-corporate-
procedures test of Barnett, the court clearly disagreed with Barnett's
characterization of a shareholders' meeting as being "unavailable" as a
remedy to minority shareholders where the majority controlled suffi-
cient votes to ensure approval of the challenged transaction." The
91 See Comment, Shareholders' Derivative Suit to Enforce a Corporate Right of
Action Against Directors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 578, 582 (1966).
92 See R. Jennings and H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1354 (3d ed. 1972): "The
Barnett case appears to be destined to be always distinguished, but never followed."
But see Adair v. Schneider, 293 F. Supp. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a discussion
critical of the Barnett decision, see Comment, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 515 (1966).
99 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
94 Id. at 362.
95 Id. at 361.
96 Id. at 362. At the trial on the merits, the district court found that the proxy
statement was not misleading and dismissed the complaint. The dismissal was subse-
quently upheld by the Second Circuit. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1971).
97 At the end of its decision, the court asserts, without elaboration, that List v.
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idea that minority shareholders are entitled to full disclosure even
where no intracorporate remedies are available to them is not new—
indeed, the conceptual underpinning of the disclosure, provisions of the
Exchange Act is that full public disclosure will itself deter and prevent
corporate misdealing."
One year after Laurenzano, the Southern District of New York
decided the case of Entel v. Allen." The plaintiffs sought an injunction,
alleging that the transaction contemplated by the majority constituted
a fraudulent scheme which violated their fiduciary duty under state
corporation law. Had the details of the proposed transaction been fully
disclosed to the minority, they argued, a state court action could have
been brought to enjoin the plan. The court held that where minority
shareholders did not exercise their state law right to object to a corpo-
rate structural change because they were deceived by a proxy statement
containing omissions and misleading information, a cause of action
exists under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 1 " The Entel case is signifi-
cant for two reasons. First, in finding the loss of an extra-corporate
remedy to be a sufficient causal connection to the plaintiff's alleged
injury to sustain an action under 10b-5, it apparently abandoned the
internal-corporate-procedures test of causation laid down in Barnett.
Second, it implied that a scheme to breach a state-imposed fiduciary
duty to a minority shareholder, if undisclosed, might also constitute a
violation of federal law.'"
A more direct repudiation of the Barnett rationale was effected by
the Seventh Circuit in an even more recent case, Swanson v. American
Consumer Industries, Inc., 102 where the 10b-.5 action of a minority
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), "would appear to preclude a section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 claim distinct from a section 14 claim in the precise factual situation
here presented." 264 F. Supp. at 362. The basis for such a distinction by the court is
unclear. In List, the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed because the court found that
the plaintiff's action was not affected by the alleged failure to disclose information. Thus,
the elements of materiality and reliance were lacking. However, if the court felt that
a plaintiff's inability to prevent a transaction meant that no information either mis-
represented or undisclosed could be "material" to him within the meaning of rule 10b-5,
it is difficult to see why this would not also destroy the materiality of the misrepresenta-
tion under rule 14a-9. Further, although the court in List found that the plaintiff's injury
could not have been caused by the alleged misrepresentation since he did not rely on it,
the Laurenzano court did find that proving a misrepresentation in the proxy statement
would establish a causal relationship between it and the plaintiff's injury.
08 See, e.g., In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961):
"If ... disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic
under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forego the transaction."
99 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
100 Id. at 70 (Memorandum on Motion to Reargue). The court, believing such an
extension of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 should best be left to Congress, reluctantly
adopted its position in Entel, having been overruled twice in the previous six months in
cases where it attempted to limit the scope of the rule. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co.,
374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'g 252 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); A.T. Brod & Co.
v. Pcrlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'g the unreported district court decision.
101 270 F. Supp. at 70.
11)2 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969).
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shareholder to prevent a freeze-out based on an allegedly deceptive
proxy statement was allowed despite the ownership by the majority of
eighty-seven percent of the stock.103
 Although the Swanson holding
was based on Laurenzano, the decision was also placed on public policy
grounds. The court reasoned that mechanical application of the internal-
corporate-procedures test would lead to approval of all types of fraudu-
lent conduct against minority shareholders by controlling shareholders
who held a sufficient number of votes to approve corporate structural
changes under state law.101
In Krafcisin the district court ignored these later cases in adopt-
ing the old Barnett rationale. In spite of Laurenzano, the court rejected
as an exercise in futility plaintiff's claim that, had he not been deceived
by the misrepresentations and omissions of the majority, he might have
been able to bring pressure on the majority to abandon the dissolution
and freeze-out by publicizing the inequity of the transaction. In spite
of Entel, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the possibility of a
state court action to enjoin the freeze-out, had the scheme been fully
disclosed, was sufficient to establish causation. The Swanson case was
distinguished strictly on Barnett reasoning, the court noting that the
proposed transaction in Swanson was a sale of the corporate assets and
a misrepresentation could have dissuaded the plaintiff from asserting
his appraisal rights (an internal corporate procedure), whereas in
Kral cisin no such rights existed.'"
The only positive note sounded by the Krafcisin court for minor-
ity freeze-out victims was some dicta in the case suggesting that the
court may be willing, in some situations, to find a causal relationship
between a plaintiff's injury and a deceptive act by the majority where
the deceptive act prevents or deters the plaintiff from the timely asser-
tion of a state law right against the transaction. It is not clear, however,
what sort of situation would fit the court's requirements.
In Bryan, the district court approached the question of causation
more cautiously, looking first to whether the alleged deceptive acts
of the defendant had caused the plaintiff's injury by inducing him to
buy or sell shares in reliance thereon. It thus recognized the inter-
dependency of the elements of a 10b-5 cause of action. Cases such as
Barnett, Laurenzano and Entel had not needed to consider the buyer-
seller issue since the alleged misrepresentations occurred in the context
of a proxy statement and section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 establish no
buyer-seller requirement.'"
Because of this felt need to identify the plaintiff as a buyer or
"3 Id. at 1331-32.
1 " Id. at 1331.
"5 f1972-1973] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 93,586, at 92,729.
100 With the exception of the buyer-seller requirement, however, rules 14a-9 and
1013-5 impose an identical standard of conduct in regard to false misrepresentations in
connection with the sale of stock. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9(a), .10b-5(b) (1972).
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seller of shares, the first case the Bryan court looked to was Vine v.
Beneficial Finance Co.,'" where the Second Circuit held that a minor-
ity shareholder forced to relinquish his shares by reason of a merger
of his corporation into another was a "forced seller" and therefore
entitled to sue under rule 10b-5. The Vine court found causation to be
present by reason of the fact that, although the plaintiff did not tender
his shares in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations made by the
defendant, a sufficient number of other shareholders did so to give
the defendant sufficient control to effect the merger over plaintiff's ob-
jection.'" Significantly, the defendant did not have sufficient control
to ensure approval of the merger prior to the tender offer containing
the alleged violation.
The rationale of Vine was picked up by the Fifth Circuit and ex-
tended in Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Finance Corp.,'" involving
a freeze-out scheme utilizing a corporate liquidation and dissolution.
The court adopted the reasoning of Vine, stating: "[A] shareholder
should be treated as a seller when the nature of his investment has been
fundamentally changed from an interest in a going enterprise into a
right solely to a payment of money for his shares." 11° The Fifth Circuit
then held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action under 10b-5
merely by alleging the existence of a fraudulent and manipulative
scheme which had the effect of converting him into a forced seller. 11"
Apparently, no allegation of misrepresentation or nondisclosure on the
part of the defendant was necessary. No mention was made of causa-
tion, although the court may have assumed that the fraudulent scheme
which converted the plaintiff into a forced seller was the cause of the
plaintiff's injury. If no misrepresentation was necessary where a scheme
to defraud existed, the only question inadequately answered by Dudley
was the meaning to be given to the term "defraud" in applying 10b-5.
While fraud in securities transactions had, for the most part, been
difficult to prove in many state courts, some federal courts have ap-
parently used it to mean simply "do something bad to." 112
The Bryan decision represents a further extension of the Dudley
reasoning with respect to the application of rule 10b-5, and posits an
interesting definition for "fraud." In Bryan, the Northern District of
Georgia quickly jumped the reliance and causation hurdles, saying that
"ral ny manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance which would
cause a reasonable investor to rely thereon is meant to be outlawed." 111
107 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
108 Id. at 635.
109 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971).
110 Id. at 307.
111 Id. at 308. Although the plaintiff did allege that the manipulative scheme took
place without his knowledge, this is substantially different from an allegation of mis-
representation or nondisclosure of a material fact.
112 See R. Jennings and H. Marsh, supra note 92, at 1225 & n.18.
112 343 F. Supp. at 1069.
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It found certain misrepresentations were made by the majority, but
clearly stated that there would still be a 10b-5 violation if the acts
of the majority themselves constituted fraud. Presumably the decision
would have been the same whether or not the defendants had made
the misrepresentations which they argued were irrelevant by reason of
their eighty-five percent ownership. In defining fraud under 10b-5,
however, the court did not have in mind the elements of common law
fraud, but instead referred to a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by
a majority or dominant shareholder to his corporation as set forth
by the Supreme Court in Pepper v. Litton.'" The court proceeded to
extend this fiduciary duty of the majority to minority shareholders,
and in effect transformed the traditional elements of a 10b-5 violation
—a materially deceptive act, reliance, and causation—into a much
broader prohibition of any manipulative act which would constitute
a breach of this duty. Such an approach renders the requirement of
misrepresentation causally connected to the plaintiff's injury unneces-
sary. The court did not need to go as far as it did. Having found
a material nondisclosure, the court could have found such omission to
be the cause of the plaintiff's injury. Since the transaction in question
was a merger giving the plaintiff an appraisal right, Bryan, like the
Swanson case, could have been easily distinguished from Krafcisin,
which involved a dissolution with no such appraisal right. However,
the court chose not to rest its decision on this ground. Instead the
court went beyond Dudley, holding that the formation of the new
corporation "was a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud Bryan of his
stock" and that "Rjhe proposed merger itself was a course of business
which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon Bryan, in connection
with the sale of his stock."' Thus, the court seemed to be saying
that the very formulation and execution of a plan to freeze-out a mi-
nority shareholder, if unsupported by some reasonable business pur-
pose, is itself sufficient to breach the fiduciary duty to the minority
imposed upon majority shareholders under rule 10b-5.
If this interpretation of the Bryan decision is correct, it represents
a significant extension of prior 10b-5 concepts and creates a federal
fiduciary duty under subsections (a) and (c) of the rule not hitherto
recognized except under state law." The adoption of the Pepper stan-
dard of fiduciary duty as the standard of loyalty owed by majority
to minority shareholders brings the Bryan court into the mainstream
of the trend of state law acceptance of a majority shareholder's fidu-
ciary duty to the minority, and has significant implications for the
future of the federal law of corporations.
114 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
115 343 F. Supp. at 1070.
116 The Pepper v. Litton standard was also used by the California Supreme Court
in defining the common law duty owed by a majority shareholder to the minority in
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
599 (1969). See discussion in text at notes 34-36 supra.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF Bryan
The Bryan decision, if generally followed by the federal courts,
will be the precursor of several very significant developments in the
law of corporations. First, Bryan established that, in a freeze-out situa-
tion, even if the majority shareholders have a sufficient awareness of
the Iaw to avoid making any misrepresentations or failing to disclose
any material information, utilization of. the freeze-out scheme in itself
is sufficient to breach the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholder which is embodied in rule 10b-5. 117
 Indeed, 10b-5 would
seem to be applicable even though. the minority shareholder realized
or was told that the majority's purpose in executing the structural
change was to freeze him out. Bryan himself was warned that such
structural changes would be instituted if he refused to sell his stock
to the majority.118
 Criticisms of this development may center on the
fact that the purpose of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 has been accom-
plished once full disclosure has been made.'" However, a more basic
purpose of the section has been characterized differently from that of
mere disclosure: "Subsection 10(b) authorizes the Commission by rules
and regulations to prohibit or regulate the use of any other manipula-
tive or deceptive practices which it finds detrimental to the interest
of the investor." 120
 If this is recognized by the courts as the more fun-
damental objective of 10(b), it is not illogical for a court to find a
violation of 10b-5 even though the plaintiff knew he was being frozen
out.
A second development emanating from the Bryan decision is the
clarification of the law in regard to the standard of unfairness neces-
sary for a 10b-5 violation. It was commonly understood when 10b-5
was promulgated that the elements of common law fraud would not be
necessary to establish a cause of action under the rule,' but exactly
how much less than common law fraud would suffice has not been
conclusively established."' The Bryan court determined the standard
of loyalty owed by majority or controlling shareholders to the minority
to be that of a fiduciary relationship—extending beyond mere disclo-
sure. If the Bryan standard is generally accepted by the federal courts,
it will mark the creation of a federal fiduciary duty which will greatly
expand the scope of the rapidly growing federal corporation law.
The third development represented by Bryan is that the estab-
lishment of a federally recognized fiduciary duty of majority share-
117 This is true unless the freeze-out is supported by some reasonable business
purpose.
118 See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
119 Herpicb v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1970).
120 S .
 Rep, No, 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934) (emphasis added).
121 See text at notes 47-48 supra.
122 Compare SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 185-86, 195
(1963), and Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Stipp. 808, 831 (D. Del. 1951), with
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
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holders to minority shareholders places the federal law of corporations
on a parallel course with the trend of development of the standard of
loyalty between majority and minority shareholders under state law.'"
This contemporaneous development of both federal and state law to-
ward a fiduciary duty standard is indicative of an increasing willingness
on the part of the courts to protect small shareholders from manipula-
tion by dominant or controlling shareholders. Also, it is an arguable
indication of a redefinition of the traditional boundaries between the
spheres of corporate law regulated by the state and federal govern-
ments. Most fundamentally, the widespread acceptance of the fiduciary
duty of majority to minority shareholders seems to indicate an increas-
ing recognition of the right—either federally or state protected—of a
shareholder not to be deprived of his property interest in the corpora-
tion at the whim of the majority.
The practical implications of the developments represented by the
Bryan decision will be of great importance for both controlling and
minority shareholders. If Bryan is followed, a minority shareholder
will be easily able to defeat a freeze-out unless the majority has a
valid business purpose. Perhaps more importantly, the controlling
shareholder will have the burden of proving the existence of such a
business purpose. 124 As a net result, it will probably be significantly
more difficult to execute a successful freeze-out in the future. Further,
in combatting a freeze-out, a shareholder will be confronted with the
choice of proceeding in either state or federal court. Prior to the ad-
vent of the trend in the state courts to impose a fiduciary duty on
majority shareholders toward the minority, 10b-5 was obviously a
more attractive remedy.1" The widespread acceptance of the fiduciary
duty standard by the states, however, would seem to limit the attrac-
tiveness of 10b-5, particularly as it was applied before the Bryan
decision.'" Indeed, the existence of a broad state remedy would seem
to call into question the need for a federal remedy, especially since the
regulation of internal corporate affairs traditionally has been within
the ambit of state law.'" Three factors, however, will militate against
a decrease in reliance on a 10b-5 remedy by freeze-out victims. First,
although the acceptance of the fiduciary duty standard by the states
has been widespread, not every state has moved in that direction.128
123 See discussion of state law in text at notes 27-37 supra.
124 The Bryan court, in adopting the fiduciary duty standard from Pepper v. Litton,
also quoted with approval the language of the Supreme Court in Pepper imposing the
burden of proof of fairness on the controlling shareholder. 343 F. Supp. at 1068.
125 See text at note 39 supra.
126 The traditional requirements under 10b-5—misrepresentation, materiality, reliance,
causation, and a purchase or sale of securities—would, in a given case, be harder to
establish by the plaintiff than a lack of inherent fairness in the transaction, which would
be the standard in a state court applying the fiduciary duty rule.
127 See text at note 3 supra. See also Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law—An
Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1146 (1965).
128 Illinois appears to be one of the states that has not yet abandoned the "fraud"
standard for a fiduciary standard of loyalty by the majority shareholders to the minority.
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Barring actual fraud, this leaves 10b-5 as the only viable remedy for
freeze-outs in some states.' Second, the Bryan decision has extended
10b-5 to the point that it offers at least as broad a scope of protection
as the common law fiduciary duty standard. The third and perhaps
decisive factor is that a plaintiff who brings an action under 10b-5
will enjoy several procedural advantages over one who sues in stale
court. Such advantages include nationwide service of process, less re-
strictive venue, the possibility that the plaintiff would be able to bring
any state claims into the action under the doctrine of pendant juris-
diction, and broader discovery rules under the federal law." As a
result of these advantages, it seems likely that 10b-5 will remain a
viable alternative to state court actions as a remedy for corporate
freeze-outs.
CONCLUSION
Though the broad expansion of rule 10b-5 which Bryan effected
will undoubtedly be criticized as an improvident judicial extension,
the Bryan decision may be the precursor of a significant development
of the federal law of corporations. Moreover, this trend is necessary in
order to keep pace with development of sentiment in the state courts"'
and in society generally102 to offer greater protection against the vic-
timization of those who are in a less powerful economic position than
others. The Bryan interpretation imposes on majority shareholders a far
greater duty of loyalty to the minority than the majority previously
had under 10b-5, at least with regard to freeze-outs. Whether some way
will be found under the federal securities laws to provide the same de-
gree of protection to minority shareholders with regard to other aspects
of corporate life remains to be seen.
MICHAEL D. MALFITANO
See Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 III. App. 261, 106 N.E.2d 848 (1952): "The majority
shareholders do not by the mere reason of their holdings thereby become trustees for
the minority stockholder . . . ." Id. at 274, 106 N.E.2d at 854.
120 Cf. Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 III. App. 153, 63 N.E.2d 630 (1945).
100 W. Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations 794-95 (4th ed. 1969).
131 Such a sentiment is indicated by the accelerating trend toward state court
acceptance of the majority shareholder's fiduciary duty to the minority. See text at
notes 34-35 supra.
182 One of the most significant examples of the increasing societal concern for the
plight of the economic underdog is the great increase in interest in consumer protection
in recent years. See, e.g., Knauer, No Minor Imperfection, 49 Neb. L. Rev. 722 (1970) ;
Note, Federal jurisdiction—Protective Jurisdiction and Adoption as Alternative Tech-
niques for Conferring Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Actions, 69 Mich.
L. Rev. 710 (1971).
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